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Abstract
Having analyzed the formal aspects of Wallace’s proof of the Born rule, we now
discuss the concepts and axioms upon which it is built. Justification for most axioms
is shown to be problematic, and at times contradictory. Some of the problems are
caused by ambiguities in the concepts used. We conclude the axioms are not reasonable
enough to be taken as mandates of rationality in Everettian Quantum Mechanics. This
invalidates the interpretation of Wallace’s result as meaning it would be rational for
Everettian agents to decide using the Born rule.
1 Introduction
This paper is a continuation of a preceding one [Man17a], in which Wallace’s proof of
the Born rule was reorganized and verified for formal errors. We proceed by checking
his concepts for ambiguities, and questioning his justifications for the axioms.
To solve the measurement problem of the usual formulation of Quantum Mechanics,
H. Everett III [DG73, EI57] proposed in 1957 an alternative, known as the ManyWorlds
Interpretation. It rejects the Measurement Postulate (and the Born rule), and applies
the rest of the usual formalism to all systems (even macroscopic ones), at all times
(even during measurements). From this it should follow that the quantum state of an
observer, after a measurement, is a superposition of distinct versions of himself, each
correlated to one of the results and unaware of the others. Each component of such
macroscopic superposition evolves independently, being called a world or branch.
But Everett’s formulation has its own problems. The preferred basis one is whether
there is a natural way to decompose a macroscopic quantum state into branches, and
how similar to our (quasi-)classical world these are. D.Wallace [Wal12] has proposed
a solution, by combining the decoherent histories and Everettian formalisms.
There is also a probability problem: how to make sense of quantum probabilities,
in a deterministic theory in which all possible measurement results happen (even if in
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different worlds). D.Deutsch [Deu99] has proposed using decision theory to show that,
under Everettian conditions, it would be rational to decide on bets about the results of
quantum measurements as if they were probabilistic and followed the Born rule. Based
on this idea, Wallace has produced a formal proof of the Born rule [Wal10, Wal12].
Having shown [Man17a] it to be, from a strictly formal point of view, mostly correct
(some corrections were needed), in this article we continue our analysis with a critique
of the concepts and axioms upon which the proof is based. As we show, most are hard
to justify from a more physical perspective.
A source of difficulties is that use of decision theory requires worlds where narratives
with agents and bets make sense, so it depends on the preferred basis problem being
solved. But Wallace’s use of decoherence to solve it may implicitly rely on the Born
rule, resulting in a circular argument [Bak07]. Although he claims decoherence can be
used without probabilities, we have shown [Man17b] that, prior to the Born rule, one
can not be sure the resulting branches would be sufficiently well behaved.
There are also ambiguities in concepts, like macrostate and reward, which are not
characterized in enough detail. This allows for incompatible interpretations, and Wal-
lace seems to rely on different ones to justify various axioms. Moreover, the formal
statements of some axioms differ significantly from what he describes and justifies,
while others include important details left unexplained.
Other authors [DB13a, DB13b, Jan16, Lew16, Mal08, Wil13] have criticized some
of Wallace’s axioms, but they have tended to focus on his informal presentation. Our
analysis goes deeper into the formal details, contrasting them with their informal de-
scription. We also question ideas used to justify the axioms, identifying previously
ignored problems in most of them. These may invalidate their proposed status as
mandates of rationality, putting in doubt the meaning of Wallace’s result.
In section 2 we review the Everettian formalism, its problems, and proposed so-
lutions, including results of our analysis of Wallace’s solution to the preferred basis
problem. Section 3 presents the quantum decision problem and concepts used in the
proof of the Born rule, with a critique of the ambiguities in their characterizations.
In section 4 Wallace’s axioms are analyzed, and difficulties in their justifications are
pointed out. Section 5 summarizes the problems that were identified.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Everettian Quantum Mechanics
The Many Worlds Interpretation, or Everettian Quantum Mechanics (EQM), is an
attempt, proposed by H.Everett III [DG73, EI57], at solving problems of the usual
Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (CQM), such as:
• measurement problem: to characterize which quantum processes do not follow
the deterministic Schro¨dinger equation, constituting measurements; to explain
the probabilistic nature of the results and the collapse of the wavefunction.
• quantum-classical transition: is quantum mechanics valid for all systems (micro-
or macroscopic), with classical mechanics emerging as a particular case for large
systems? If so, which mechanism prevents macroscopic quantum superpositions?
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In EQM the Measurement Postulate is rejected, and the rest of the quantum for-
malism is applied even to macroscopic systems. Evolution is always deterministic, even
in measurements, following Schro¨dinger’s equation. It leads to macroscopic superposi-
tions, but also explains why observers do not perceive them. If not for some unsolved
problems, it might explain quantum measurements, and provide the connection be-
tween quantum and classical mechanics.
A measurement, in this theory, is just quantum entanglement of the measuring
device with whatever is being measured. More precisely, a measuring device for a basis
{|i〉} of a system is any apparatus, in a quantum state |D〉, which interacts in such a
way that, if the system is in state |i〉, the composite state evolves as1
|i〉 ⊗ |D〉 7−→ |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 ,
where |Di〉 is a new state of the device, registering result i. Linearity of Schro¨dinger’s
equation implies that, if the system is in a superposition
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
ci |i〉 , (1)
the composite state evolves as
|ψ〉 ⊗ |D〉 =
(∑
i
ci |i〉
)
⊗ |D〉 7−→
∑
i
ci |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 . (2)
This final state is to be accepted as an actual quantum superposition of macroscopic
states. But it will not be perceived as such by an observer looking at the device, as,
by the same argument, his state |O〉 will evolve into a superposition, according to(∑
i
ci |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉
)
⊗ |O〉 7−→
∑
i
ci |i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 ⊗ |Oi〉 ,
with |Oi〉 representing a state in which he saw result i. By linearity, each component
|i〉 ⊗ |Di〉 ⊗ |Oi〉 evolves independently, as if the others did not exist, as long as inter-
ference is negligible. In section 2.3 we show why this assumption may be reasonable.
Everett’s interpretation of this final state is that the observer has actually split into
different versions of himself, each seeing a result. Each version evolves as if the initial
state had been |i〉 ⊗ |D〉 ⊗ |O〉, so he does not feel the splitting, nor the existence of
his other versions. Each component is called a world or branch, and this evolution of
one world into a superposition of many is a branching process. So in EQM all possible
results of a measurement actually happen, but in different worlds. The observer in
state |Oi〉 only thinks the system has collapsed into |i〉 because he does not see the
whole picture, with all other results and versions of himself.
Problems plaguing CQM disappear in EQM, but new ones come along, such as the
probability and preferred basis problems, described in the next sections.
1For simplicity, we assume the system remains in state |i〉, but this is not necessary.
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2.2 The Probability Problem
When measuring (1), in EQM, any result i with ci 6= 0 is obtained with certainty, even
if only one version of the observer sees it. The probability problem is to reconcile this
with experiments, which suggest results are probabilistic and follow the Born rule:
Born Rule. In CQM, when measuring (1) in an orthonormal basis {|i〉}, the proba-
bility of obtaining result i is given by its Born weight wi =
|ci|
2
‖ψ‖2 =
|〈i|ψ〉|2
〈ψ|ψ〉 .
The problem has a qualitative aspect: how probabilities emerge in a deterministic
theory. In classical mechanics processes can appear random due to ignorance of details,
but in EQMwe must explain the apparent randomness even if the quantum state and its
evolution are perfectly known. Wallace [Wal12] defends an operational and functional
definition of probability, attained via decision theory and Bayesian inference.
There is also the quantitative aspect of showing that probability values agree with
the Born rule. A counting measure, based on the idea that a measurement with n
results produces n branches, might seem most natural for EQM, in disagreement with
that rule. But Wallace argues there is no good way to count branches. In EQM mea-
surements are no different than other quantum processes, so branchings can happen
in all interactions, becoming a continuous and pervasive phenomenon. As most inter-
actions involve few particles, many branches would be macroscopically similar, and a
coarse-graining might reduce and stabilize their number. But such number would be
somewhat arbitrary, depending on the chosen fineness of grain.
Everett [EI57] proved that if a measure can be attributed to branches, and is pre-
served by further branchings, it equals the Born weights. And the total measure of
branches with results deviating from the Born rule tends to 0, as the number of mea-
surements tends to infinity. But for finite experiments this only means branches with
frequencies deviating beyond a given error have small measure, which only makes them
negligible if Born weights have a probabilistic interpretation, in a circular argument.
A similar idea was proposed by Graham [Gra73], with the same problem.
Gleason’s theorem [Gle57] also implies the Born rule, if the probability of a branch
does not depend on what other branches there are in the decomposition basis. But
until we know how probabilities emerge in EQM, we can not assume they satisfy such
condition (of course, if they do not, it would mean EQM is incorrect).
Other attempts [AL88, BHZ06, Han03, Zur05] have been made to solve the prob-
ability problem, without success. We focus on Deutsch and Wallace’s use of decision
theory.
Decision theory [Kar14, Kre88, PI09] shows that, in situations with probabilistic
outcomes, rational (in an axiomatically defined sense) decisions follow a Principle of
Maximization of Expected Utility: a subjective utility value is attributed to each out-
come, and choices with higher expected utility (the probability-weighted average of
utilities) are preferable. When probabilities are unknown, L. Savage [Sav72] has shown
that, with extra rational constraints, the principle remains valid, but with subjective
probabilities.
Deutsch [Deu99] proposed using this theory to show that, in an Everettian universe
(i.e. one governed by EQM), a rational decision maker should decide on bets about
results of quantum experiments as if outcomes were probabilistic, with probabilities
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given by the Born weights. More precisely, he should follow the Principle of Maximiza-
tion of Expected Utility, but with expected utilities redefined using Born weights in
place of probabilities in the weighted average.
Critics [BCF+00, HP06, Mal08, Pri06] contested his assumptions, proposed rea-
sonable decision strategies violating his result, or questioned its meaning. In response,
Wallace has made increasingly sophisticated attempts [Wal03, Wal07, Wal10, Wal12] to
clarify Deutsch’s idea. Although many authors [Ass11, CS13, Pol01, Rea18, SBKW10,
SC16, Wil13] consider this approach promising, critics remain unconvinced [Alb10,
DT14, Fin09, Jan16, Ken10, Mau14, Pri10], proposing counterexamples or questioning
Wallace’s axioms, though most have focused on his informal presentation.
In [Man17a] we have analyzed Wallace’s proof [Wal10, Wal12] from a formal per-
spective, showing it to be mostly correct (there are some problems but they seem
fixable). In this article, however, we show that, from a more physical point of view,
his concepts and axioms face serious problems, possibly invalidating his result.
2.3 The Preferred Basis Problem
The preferred basis problem is how to find a natural way to decompose a macroscopic
quantum state into branches behaving like the classical reality we observe (even if not
all of them, and not all the time). We focus on Wallace’s approach [Wal12], based on
decoherent histories.
2.3.1 Decoherence
Decoherence [JZK+03, Sch07, Zur02] is a process by which an open quantum system
loses some quantum characteristics, as it interacts and gets entangled with its en-
vironment. Models show some pointer states are more robust with respect to such
interaction, having a stronger tendency to remain disentangled. For example, in the
quantum brownian motion, considered a good paradigm for a macroscopic system scat-
tering particles from the environment, they are minimum-uncertainty Gaussian packets
(coherent states) |x, p〉, forming an overcomplete set of vectors.
As the environment is differently affected by distinct pointer states, and such dif-
ferences spread across its many degrees of freedom, it rapidly evolves into (almost)
orthogonal states. Off-diagonal elements (coherences) of the reduced density matrix
of the system, with respect to the pointer states, decay extremely fast. This (almost)
eliminates interference between such states, and we say the system has decohered. Close
pointer states take longer to decohere, but this problem can be reduced by coarse grain-
ing, as we discuss in section 2.3.3. As the reduced density matrix becomes (nearly)
diagonal, it formally resembles a classical probabilistic mixture, and this is seen as an
important step in obtaining classicality out of quantum systems.
Evolution of an open quantum system is usually studied using a master equation for
its reduced density matrix. But it lacks unitarity, which is central to Wallace’s argu-
ments. So he does not take such approach, turning instead to the consistent/decoherent
histories formalisms, which apply to closed quantum systems.
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2.3.2 Consistent Histories
The Consistent Histories formalism [Gri84, Gri02, Omn88, Omn99] identifies condi-
tions allowing us to assign classical probabilities to sets of alternative histories, con-
ceived as sequences of events or propositions about a quantum system.
Its point of view is opposite to the Everettian one: quantum evolution is always
stochastic, and quantum states are only tools for calculating probabilities in a set of
possible evolutions, only one of which actually happens. Still, parts of the formalism
adapt well to the Everettian setting, if appropriately reinterpreted. We present a
simplified version2, assuming a normalized pure initial state ψ0 at time t0.
A quantum sample space is an orthogonal projective decomposition of Hilbert
space, i.e. a family {Pα} of orthogonal projection operators with PαPβ = δαβPα
and
∑
α Pα = 1, representing an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive events or propo-
sitions about the system. A history space is a sequence {Pα1(t1)}, . . . , {Pαn(tn)} of
quantum sample spaces, at times t0 < t1 < . . . < tn (the Heisenberg picture is used,
with Pα(t) = U(t, t0)
−1PαU(t, t0), where U(t, t0) is the time evolution operator given
by Schrodinger’s equation). A history α = (α1, . . . , αk, . . . , αn) is a sequence of events,
specifying one Pαk(tk) from each sample space.
In each history space, satisfying a consistency condition described below, only one
history happens, with probability postulated by
pα = ||ψα||
2 , (3)
where the branch state vector ψα = Pαn(tn) · · ·Pα1(t1)ψ0 is to be considered as just a
mathematical tool to calculate probabilities.
A history space {P¯α¯k(tk)} is a coarse-graining or coarsening of {Pαk(tk)} if each
P¯α¯k(tk) is a sum of Pαk(tk)’s. Conversely, {Pαk(tk)} is a fine-graining or refinement
of {P¯α¯k(tk)}. To fit this in the formalism, history spaces are bundled into a history
algebra, specified by taking, at each tk, a quantum event algebra, which is a Boolean
algebra3 of orthogonal projectors. The Boolean condition implies projectors commute,
so when their ranges have intersection {0} they are mutually orthogonal.
To get a history algebra, we can start with a history space and take all coarsenings.
The original projectors are minimal elements (atoms) generating the event algebras.
Not all history algebras are formed this way, and some have no atoms. An algebra is
atomic if it is generated by atoms. Wallace uses the term in such sense, but defines
it in terms of countable generators [Wal12, p.95]. This is incorrect, as any countable
algebra is generated by the set of all its elements, even if it has no minimal ones.
Given a coarsening {P¯α¯k(tk)} of {Pαk(tk)}, each coarser history α¯ can be seen as
a family of finer ones, with α ∈ α¯ if, for each k, the range of P¯α¯k(tk) contains that
of Pαk(tk). The consistent histories formalism requires the pα’s to behave as classical
probabilities, so they must be additive, pα¯ =
∑
α∈α¯ pα. Hence there must be no
interference between histories, and 〈ψα|ψβ〉 = 0 if α 6= β. History spaces satisfying this
are called consistent4 (relative to ψ0), and are the only ones allowed in the formalism.
2Reflecting its stochastic approach, Consistent Histories is usually presented using density operators.
3With operations P1 ∧ P2 = P1P2, P1 ∨ P2 = P1 + P2 − P1P2, and ¬P = 1− P .
4The terminology varies. Wallace uses consistency for additivity of probabilities, and decoherence for
non-interference, which gets mixed with the related, but not equivalent, concept from section 2.3.1.
6
Two consistent history spaces can be incompatible, in the sense that they can not be
combined into a single consistent one. The formalism allows either one to be used in
describing a quantum process, but not both at once.
A history space has a branching structure (relative to ψ0) if histories do not merge
after diverging, i.e. if α and β satisfy αi 6= βi and αj = βj for some i < j, one of them
has zero probability. Consistency and branching are related as follows [Gri93, Wal12]:
Branching-Consistency Theorem. 5 Any history space with a branching structure
is consistent, and the converse holds for some consistent refinement of it.
The idea [Wal12, p.429] for the converse is that, since by consistency the ψα’s are
orthogonal, a branching refinement can be constructed from projectors 1
pα
|ψα〉〈ψα|.
Wallace claims [Wal12, p.96] this result extends to history algebras, which is wrong,
as these projectors might not be in the original algebra.
2.3.3 Decoherent Histories
Consistent Histories admits histories that are far from classical. The Decoherent His-
tories formalism, developed by Gell-Mann and Hartle [GMH90, GMH93], combines
Consistent Histories and decoherence to get special history spaces with a more classical
behavior. Besides (approximate) consistency6, it also seeks quasi-classicality, meaning
histories approximately follow classical equations of motion, interrupted at times (as
in quantum measurements) by some quantum behavior.
In this formalism, the space of relevant variables of the system of interest is parti-
tioned in cells Σα, large in comparison with the coherence lenght (below which deco-
herence is not effective), yet small enough for the required precision. This determines
a quantum sample space given by operators Pα ⊗ 1env, where
Pα =
∫
Σα
dx|x〉〈x|, (4)
and 1env is the identity operator for the environment (taken to include the irrelevant
variables of the system). A history α specifies, at a sequence of times tk, in which Σαk
the system is7. Coarsenings and refinements are obtained varying cell size.
For large enough cells, states in the range of different Pα’s are distinct enough to
quickly get entangled to (almost) orthogonal states of the environment. Orthogonality
tends to subsist, as the environment evolves, for its many degrees of freedom keep
records of the history. For example, particles scattered by the system in different
directions, at distinct Σα’s, tend to remain in (almost) orthogonal states, and affect
other degrees of freedom in distinct ways. Erasing from the environment all traces of
the history is impossible in practice. Of course, as different states of the environment
evolve, they can spontaneously develop similar components, with blurred records, but
their Born weights would be negligibly small.
As records ensure (almost) consistency, (almost) additive probabilities can be as-
signed to histories, as in Consistent Histories. Some interference can remain, but it is
5Branching-Decoherence Theorem, in Wallace’s terminology.
6In Gell-Mann and Hartle’s terminology, medium decoherence.
7If necessary, different families of cells can be used at each time.
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negligible if histories are coarse enough. Deviations in the additivity of probabilities
should be irrelevant, as long as they are too small to be detected experimentally.
The Branching-Consistency Theorem ensures some refinement has a branching struc-
ture. But it will not be in terms of projectors Pα˜⊗1env into smaller cells Σα˜, requiring
projectors to separate different records in the environment. And the branching struc-
ture will be approximate: there will actually be a mesh of tiny probability branches
connecting and interfering (negligibly) with all main branches.
Models show that, if histories are coarse enough, and the system has enough inertia
to resist noise from the environment, histories with non-negligible probabilities will
(approximately) follow classical equations of motion, with a stochastic force.
So (almost) consistent history spaces seem to emerge naturally in Decoherent His-
tories, and their non-negligible histories are quasi-classical. However, we can still have
incompatible descriptions of the evolution, as shown by Dowker and Kent [DK96].
2.3.4 Non-Probabilistic Decoherent Histories
Here we review the conclusions of our analysis of Wallace’s proposed adaptation [Wal12]
of Decoherent Histories to solve the preferred basis problem, referring to [Man17b] for
a more detailed discussion.
The trouble with his solution is that, as EQM is not stochastic and all histories
happen, probabilities can not be postulated as in (3), they must be obtained proving
the Born rule. But Wallace’s proof of such rule depends on branches provided by
Decoherent Histories, forming a circular argument [Bak07].
To avoid this, his proof of the Born rule would have to be compatible with Non-
Probabilistic Decoherent Histories [Man17b], meaning the non-probabilistic parts of
the Decoherent Histories formalism, reinterpreted from an Everettian perspective. In
this handicapped formalism, approximations indicated in section 2.3.3, usually justified
on the basis of negligible probabilities, must be reexamined.
Wallace has suggested [Wal12, p.253] non-probabilistic reasons for them, but they
do not seem valid. His arguments rely on the assumption that EQM is a reasonable
physical theory, in which small perturbations in a quantum state do not drastically
change the emergent structure of worlds. But the trouble with EQM is precisely that
we are not sure it makes reasonable predictions.
One may argue no physical model describes reality with absolute precision, so it
is only fair that we accept Wallace’s approximations. However, while in most theories
approximations correspond just to slight deviations in the values of some quantities,
in Wallace’s case the state predicted by his model and the approximate one he wishes
to use (with tiny components discarded) are literally worlds apart.
If we are to take EQM and Wallace’s use of Decoherent Histories seriously, any cell
Σα in which the wavefunction does not vanish completely corresponds to some branch.
Whether such world is irrelevant when its Born weight is small is a question that must
wait until the Born rule is proven, unless another reason is found. Even with the
Born rule, we would have to question what does it mean to consider a world (and its
inhabitants) irrelevant just because its Born weight can be treated as if it represented
a low probability, when the theory tells us such world definitely exists.
A possible solution might be to consider only causal histories [Man17b] (branches
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with Born weight large enough to resist interference and sustain causal relations) as
corresponding to actual worlds. But that formalism is still in its early stages of devel-
opment, and it may face a serious problem: if only branches with Born weights above
some threshold represent real worlds, what happens to a world just above such cutoff
once a quantum measurement splits it into smaller branches? Is our world headed
towards extinction as we perform more and more quantum experiments?
In any case, if we accept that small components can be neglected prior to any
probabilistic interpretation, we may as well forget Wallace’s proof of the Born rule and
accept Everett’s simpler one.
Until the formalism of Non-Probabilistic Decoherent Histories is complemented by
the Born rule, we must admit it could have strange features, as discussed in [Man17b]:
1. Worlds represented by small amplitude branches must be considered as real and
relevant as large ones. This causes branch discontinuities : arbitrarily small
changes in a quantum state can introduce all kinds of different worlds.
2. As wavefunctions tend to spread, generating tiny components far away, (nearly)
all macroscopic histories happen and are equally relevant, no matter how erratic.
The branching structure disappears into the mesh described in section 2.3.3, as
no branches stand out anymore for being more probable.
3. An alternative view is that there is no real macroscopic history, as all macroscopic
states tend to exist at all times. For one such state to be absent the wavefunction
must totally vanish in the corresponding cell, which only happens exceptionally.
4. Branches can exhibit macroscopic quantum jumps all the time, and records are
unreliable, compromising any macroscopic sense of causality. Even branches al-
lowing a meaningful macroscopic narrative keep sprouting weird subbranches.
5. Tiny amplitude branches suffer significant interference from much larger ones.
6. A branch can follow classical equations without resembling our world, as it might
not even have atoms, whose stability depends on quantum probabilities.
7. Decoherence does not happen in terms of sharp boundary cells, as pointer states
|πx〉 tend to be peaked at a point x, but have small tails across all space. Usually
it does not matter, as the tails represent negligible probabilities. Without such
interpretation, (4) should be replaced by the following projectors, which can give
more stable branches, but are only almost orthogonal to each other:
Pα =
∫
Σα
dx|πx〉〈πx|. (5)
8. Orthogonality might not mean in EQM the same as in CQM, as the measurement
process (2) can occur in an almost orthogonal basis (perturbing its states to
preserve unitarity). So orthogonal states might not be mutually exclusive when
measured. An almost orthogonal set of branches can be linearly dependent, so,
even allowing for coarsenings or refinements, decompositions might be non unique.
And two decompositions of a state can involve quite different sets of branches.
These weird results suggest that Wallace’s proposed mix of EQM and Decoherent
Histories (prior to a probabilistic interpretation) might not be viable. If the Born rule
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can be proven, despite these problems, they might not matter anymore, affecting only
very unlikely branches. But in proving such rule they must be taken into account.
3 Quantum Decision Problem and Related Concepts
We present Wallace’s quantum decision problem, discussing the concepts involved and
the framework in which it is set up. The characterizations of some concepts are shown
to be vague, with ambiguities that will affect the justifications for the axioms. Also,
some concepts are supposed to emerge from the solution of the preferred basis problem,
which, as seen in section 2.3.4, is problematic prior to the Born rule.
3.1 A Framework for Quantum Decision Theory
To analyze Wallace’s concepts and axioms, we must first recognize the framework in
which they are set. For this, it is important to have in mind that EQM is not (yet) just
Universal Unitary Quantum Mechanics (UUQM), by which we mean the unitary part
of the usual quantum formalism (i.e. discarding the Measurement Postulate), applied
to all systems, at all times. Rather, EQM can be roughly described as UUQM plus the
claim that, with the proper interpretation, (branchwise) classical mechanics and the
usual quantum results (including the Born rule) emerge from it somehow.
As Wallace aims to justify such claim, he can not take EQM as fully valid from the
start. He can not start from UUQM either, as such formalism is still too raw to provide
the classical ingredients he needs: a decision theoretic proof requires a framework in
which narratives with agents, bets and payoffs make sense. His starting point seems
to be what we call Almost Everettian Quantum Mechanics (AEQM): UUQM plus a
hypothesis that a branching structure of worlds, reasonably similar to ours, emerge from
it, with the Born rule being the only missing ingredient for full EQM (and assuming
that lack of such rule does not impair the rest of the picture).
This may seem valid if one believes Wallace’s solution of the preferred basis problem
bridges the gap from UUQM to AEQM. But, as seen in section 2.3.4, without the Born
rule his solution can lead to something quite different. Validity of some of his concepts
and axioms will depend on a better justification for AEQM.
Also, the hypothesis of AEQM should be properly detailed. Are branches mutually
orthogonal? Is decomposition unique? Is interference negligible? Are all branches
similar to our world? How similar? If intelligent life exists, does it reason in ways we
can comprehend, or has it evolved to use another logic, better adapted to a branching
universe? Is some kind of rationality even possible?
Wallace’s assumptions regarding these questions, though not always clearly stated,
are implicit in his concepts and axioms, whose validity depends on the answers being
properly justified. Even if at times he admits an Everettian universe might not be
as expected, for the most part he seems to believe his solution of the preferred basis
problem provides branches similar enough to our world to have all required properties.
One must however set aside any unwillingness to admit consequences of the formalism
other than the desired ones, and consider how the possibilities of section 2.3.4 impact
his concepts and axioms.
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3.2 Quantum Decision Problem
Wallace describes [Wal12, p.163] a quantum decision problem as one where, in an
Everettian universe, a system prepared in some state is to be measured. Bets are
available, giving in each branch a payoff depending on the corresponding result. And
an Everettian agent (someone who knows EQM correctly describes his universe, and
knows the Born weights of that state in the measurement basis) must decide which
bets he prefers. Formally, the problem is specified by:
• A separable Hilbert space H.
• An event space E , which is a complete Boolean algebra of subspaces of H (with
H ∈ E), under the operations of conjunction ∧ (intersection), disjunction ∨ (clo-
sure of the span of the union), and orthogonal complement ⊥. A partition of
E ∈ E is a set of mutually orthogonal events whose disjunction is E.
• A set of macrostates M, which is a subset of E such that any E ∈ E has a
partition in macrostates.
• A set of rewards R, which is a partition of H.
• For each E ∈ E , a set UE of unitary operators from E into H, the acts available
at E. The following conditions are required for any E,F ∈ E , where U |E is the
restriction of U to E, OU is the smallest event containing the range of U , and 1E
is the identity act at E:
– Restriction: If F ⊂ E and U ∈ UE then U |F∈ UF .
– Composition: If U ∈ UE and V ∈ UOU then V U ∈ UE .
– Indolence: If UE 6= ∅ then 1E ∈ UE .
– Continuation: If U ∈ UE then UOU 6= ∅.
– Irreversibility: If U ∈ UE∨F then OU|E ∧ OU|F = ∅.
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A solution is given by a preference order ≻ψ on UM , for each state ψ of each
M ∈M, satisfying Wallace’s axioms.
Justifications for the axioms depend on how the above concepts are interpreted.
Wallace hints at how he conceives of them, but important details are left out, allowing
for conflicting interpretations. As he adopts a framework provided by the decoherent
histories formalism, H should to be the Hilbert space of the total system of interest
(agent, measuring device, payoffs, etc.), plus its environment.
3.3 Events
Intuitively, an event E ∈ E is the subspace spanned by all states satisfying some
proposition. Operators ∧, ∨, ⊥ play in Quantum Logic [BVN36, EGL09] roles similar
to the connectives AND, OR, NOT of Classical Logic.
An important difference between quantum and classical (Boolean) logics is that the
distributive law fails. By requiring E to be a Boolean algebra, Wallace is imposing a
classical structure on it, in the spirit of Consistent Histories. In fact, it is equivalent to
the quantum event algebras. Wallace uses the same one at all times, as for him events
8As noted in [Man17a], it should be {0} instead of ∅, and there is a missing hypothesis, that E∧F = {0}.
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represent macroproperties, emerging naturally in EQM via decoherence. The Boolean
condition implies, via distributivity, the following one:
Orthogonality Condition. Conjunction of two events E and F is zero if, and only
if, they are orthogonal, i.e. E ∧ F = {0} ⇔ E ⊥ F.
Events E and F are disjoint or mutually exclusive if, whenever a state of E is
tested for the condition of F , the result is false, and vice versa. Classically, the same
concept means no state satisfies both conditions, and is equivalent to E ∩ F = ∅.
In CQM this is replaced by E ⊥ F , since measuring the property of F in a state
nonorthogonal to it can result true (in EQM, it definitely results true in some branch).
The Orthogonality Condition makes quantum disjointness similar to the classical one,
by forbidding the use of sets of events which are not “classical enough”.
For example, we can not have in the same quantum decision problem an event
characterized by an electron having spin up and another in which it has spin in some
non-vertical direction. But we might have an event in which its measurement resulted
up and another in which it was measured in the non-vertical direction, as long as the
states of the measuring devices have enough differences to be orthogonal.
To partition an event is to decompose it in mutually exclusive subevents. Given
partitions {Ei} and {Fj} of the same event, {Fj} is a refinement of {Ei}, and {Ei}
is a coarsening of {Fj}, if each Ei admits a partition in terms of Fj ’s. With the
Orthogonality Condition, two partitions of an event always have a common refinement.
As stated in section 2.3.4, orthogonality might not play in EQM its usual role.
If almost orthogonal measurements are possible, E ⊥ F no longer ensures mutual
exclusivity (in fact, there might be no mutually exclusive events): measuring a state
of E in an appropriate almost orthogonal basis might produce a branch in F , which,
despite its tiny Born weight, can not be neglected. Likewise, use of ⊥ as a negation
operator might not be valid.
3.4 Macrostates
Wallace states [Wal12, p.164] that “the choice of macrostates is largely fixed by deco-
herence, although the precise fineness of grain of the decomposition is underspecified”.
It must not be too coarse, so “an agent can be assumed not to care exactly what the mi-
crostate is within a given macrostate”. Also, “an agent can have no practical control as
to what state she gets, within a particular macrostate, on familiar statistical-mechanics
and decoherence grounds” [Wal12, p.170].
From this, and the way Wallace uses macrostates, we infer they are to determine
the state of the system of interest at a macroscopic level, playing the role of classical
states. He seems to have in mind the ranges of operators Pα⊗1env used in decoherent
histories. Different families of cells Σα allow for refinements or coarsenings. Cells
should be large enough for decoherence, yet small enough that the agent is indifferent
to points in the same cell. States in the same M ∈ M should differ, for the system
of interest, only on microscopic details. There can be macroscopic differences in the
environment, but we are to assume they are beyond the agent’s control and he does
not care about them.
However, the Irreversibility condition (see section 4) may require macrostates to be
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further refined by partitioning the Hilbert space of the environment according to all
possible history records. So each macrostate should specify not only the macroscopic
state of the system of interest, but also the history that led to such state.
Given a partition of E ∈ E into macrostates Mi ∈ M, we say ψ ∈ E has a branch
decomposition with branches ψi ∈ Mi if ψ =
∑
i ψi. As such partitions always exit,
events are disjunctions of macrostates satisfying some common condition, and ψ ∈ E
if it is decomposable in branches having such condition.
Note that most states are not in any event other than H, as any such event is a
proper subspace. Another way to look at this is that a typical wavefunction has a
tail spreading through all cells. In CQM this tail represents tiny probabilities and can
be neglected, but if EQM is taken seriously, and macrostates are defined as above,
it means a typical state has branches in all possible macrostates. So, as stated in
section 2.3.4, the idea of a macroscopic history might be physically meaningless in this
formalism, as all macrostates tend to be present at all times.
If the Pα’s are as in (4), the Orthogonality Condition holds, but macrostates evolve
erratically, splitting all the time into all possible branches, as seen in section 2.3.4.
This makes them bad models for classical states, and Wallace’s axioms hard to justify.
With the more realist projectors (5), we might get more stability, but at the
cost of orthogonality, and the Boolean condition, being satisfied only approximately,
with all consequences entailed by almost orthogonality. For example, while with the
Orthogonality Condition two branch decompositions of ψ have a common refinement,
with almost orthogonality decomposition may be non unique, even up to refinements.
In fact, even a single branch might be decomposable into a family including physically
quite distinct branches, with wavefunctions peaked at very distant cells.
The formal definition of M is quite flexible: it can be any subset of E which gen-
erates it via disjunctions. We can even have M = E , or take it to be any set of
orthogonal subspaces whose disjunction is H, with E being the Boolean algebra it gen-
erates. Wallace mentions these as legitimate possibilities [Wal12, p.176], but they allow
for extreme cases, such as 1-dimensional macrostates, or a macrostate consisting of the
whole Hilbert space. Such artificial examples do not fit with his informal description
of macrostates, or how he uses them in justifying his axioms.
He also describes [Wal12, p.165] an event space E formed by functions supported in
open sets ofRN . He says it can not be generated by macrostates, relating it to atomless
history spaces [Wal12, p.95], to show why he would not ask that E be constructible
from M. This is confusing, as his definitions do require it. The problem here seems
to be the confusion, seen in section 2.3.2, between atoms and generators. In any case,
the example is wrong: as the topology of RN is second countable, E is generated by a
countable subset of events, which can be taken as M.
3.5 Rewards
Rewards “represent payoffs an agent could get” [Wal12, p.175], and are “a coarse-
graining of the macrostate subspaces. . . such that an agent’s only preference is to which
reward subspace she is in” [Wal12, p. 165].
In classical decision theory the terms reward or payoff are used in a broad sense,
referring not only to cash or prizes awarded but also to expenses or losses the agent
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may incur, and can include other factors deemed relevant, such as any enjoyment, effort
or time expenditure involved in the betting process.
Wallace uses these terms somewhat loosely, which causes some confusion. By
his formal definition of R, rewards are events, hence subspaces. At times he talks
about them as if they were tangible prizes, like cash (e.g. in his justification for the
Reward Availability axiom [Wal12, p.167]), but in general he seems to use the term in
its broader sense, to represent anything that might affect the agent’s preferences.
To avoid such mix-up, we adopt the following terminology:
prize: cash, trophies or other tangible elements awarded in a bet. The term can
also be used for negative elements, like the price paid to participate in a bet.
But it must not include anything that might be affected by extraneous quantum
measurements or by erasing information about the bet;
payoff: any factor affecting the agent’s preferences. Besides prizes, time, enjoyment,
and so on, it can even include branchings and information erasures used in the
betting process, if it turns out he might care about them (as we discuss later);
reward: the element of R representing a payoff. As payoffs include not just prizes but
preference factors in general, some confusion might have been avoided if Wallace
had called it preference subspace instead of reward.
Classically it is not hard to identify which factors the agent might care about, if
we have a good intuition about the situation. But intuition might not be so reliable in
the Everettian case. As we discuss later, it is not even clear whether the agent should
care about extra branchings.
Even if we knew all factors which might affect preferences, Wallace does not detail
how R is to be determined by them. The Branching Indifference axiom provides a clue
(if ψ and φ are in the same reward, with ψ in a macrostate, the agent does not care
about going from ψ to φ), but it is not enough to characterize R. Taking equivalence
classes of states according to preferences (i.e. ψ and φ are in the same reward iff the
agent is indifferent about being taken from one to the other, or perhaps from any third
state to either of them) does not work, as rewards would not be mutually orthogonal.
It seems we must first form equivalence classes of macrostates, and then take the
disjunction of each class to be a reward.
Wallace’s choice of defining rewards as subspaces (a payoff could as well have been
represented by the set of macrostates corresponding to it, instead of their disjunction)
embeds an important assumption about the agent’s preferences: if two states are in
the same reward, so the agent is indifferent between them, he must also be indifferent
between any of them and a superposition of both. The variety rule, proposed by Elga
[Wal12, p.193], is an example that a superposition of states might be preferable to
each. Maudlin [Mau14] discusses this question in more detail.
The description of R as a coarse-graining of M seems to indicate any M ∈ M
is in some r ∈ R. And, indeed, a macrostate intercepting more than one reward
would contradict Wallace’s description of these concepts. But his use of M ∧ r in the
Macrostate Indifference axiom (see section 4) suggests otherwise.
14
3.6 Acts
Intuitivelly, an act U is to represent any action of interest, like measuring a quantum
state, placing a bet, receiving a payoff, or compositions of them. Availability of an act
depends on the event, e.g. the act of deciding a bet is only available at events where
it has been placed.
In EQM, even macroscopic evolutions are described by unitary operators. But this
assumes closed systems, so each act U describes not only actions performed by the
agent and related to the decision problem, but also everything else happening in the
environment (ultimately, the whole Universe). This can include extraneous facts, like
a friend getting sick, which could alter his preference for one U over another. Perhaps
one could select for comparison only acts which do not differ significantly in their effects
on the environment, or equivalence classes of acts, but it is not clear how to do so in
practice.
A branched state has many versions of the agent, each acting on his own branch
Mi. In EQM their individual acts Ui ∈ UMi are restrictions of an U ∈ U∨iMi . Wallace
says they form a compatible act function (we just say they are compatible). Being
the Mi’s mutually orthogonal, so must be their images U(Mi). So acts in different
branches are linked, threatening the autonomy of the agent’s versions. But if evolution
of theMi’s preserves macroscopic differences, and the environment keeps (approximate)
records of the macroscopic history, the Ui’s tend to have almost orthogonal images,
and small adjustments might be enough to get perfect orthogonality. But we should
worry whether such adjustments can be made without altering significant aspects of
the acts. For example, with Non-Probabilistic Decoherent Histories they could cause
the creation or elimination of worlds which, despite their small Born weights, can not
be neglected.
The formal definition of UE suggests there can be events with no available acts, i.e.
UE = ∅. Wallace provides no explanation for this, and such events play no role in his
proof. In fact, it seems there should be no such events. As evolution via Schro¨dinger’s
equation does not preserve compact support, a wavefunction supported in some limited
region immediately develops a tail spreading through all space, i.e. it branches into
all possible macrostates. If each branch evolves independently, we should not expect
the wavefuntion to retreat into a limited region. So in general an act U should have
OU = H. By Continuation, UH 6= ∅, so by Restriction UE 6= ∅ for any E ∈ E . Hence
Indolence and Continuation could be replaced by a simpler condition, that 1E ∈ UE
for all E ∈ E .
Conditions of the form UE 6= ∅ do appear in some axioms (although originally
concealed in Wallace’s definition of available set of events [Wal12, p.176]), so they
might somehow be relevant for their validity. Again, Wallace gives no explanation. As
we show in the discussion of Reward Availability, it seems their role is just to provide
an escape from cases in which the axiom is clearly not valid.
4 Axioms
Despite using a more explicit notation and terminology, we state Wallace’s axioms as
in [Wal12], although some corrections are needed, as shown in [Man17a]. We show
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the arguments used to justify them are flawed, and sometimes rely on contradictory
ideas. Also, their formal statements include important details left unexplained, and at
times differ considerably from their informal descriptions. Moreover, some axioms are
compromised by the conceptual problems discussed above.
4.1 Richness Axioms
These are conditions concerning the acts available to the agent.
Irreversibility. Let E,F ∈ E with E∧F = {0}. If U ∈ UE∨F then OU|E∧OU|F = {0}.
Wallace does not include this as an axiom, leaving it as a condition in the definition
of UE , but it is important enough to deserve close attention. Here we have stated it
with the corrections mentioned before.
The idea of Irreversibility is that of a branching structure: evolution of distinct
branches can not generate a common one, so they do not interfere. In [Wal12, p.88],
Wallace invokes the usual arguments of decoherent histories, that preservation of
records in the environment keeps branches from interfering. But, as seen in section
2.3.4, with Non-Probabilistic Decoherent Histories records are not reliable, and there
is always some interference, even if it is small.
He also says an agent in a branch can not cause others to merge [Wal12, p.164]. But
even if he can not do it on purpose, violations of irreversibility can happen naturally,
e.g. when a wavepacket crosses the boundary of adjacent cells. And, again, with Non-
Probabilistic Decoherent Histories small violations happen all the time, and can have
a significant impact on tiny (but as relevant as any) branches.
Later Wallace discusses irreversibility at lenght [Wal12, ch.9], tracing parallels with
the Second Law of Thermodinamics. But at that point he assumes the Born rule as
proven [Wal12, p.333], so his conclusions there can not justify this condition. Also, note
that most physical laws are reversible, the Measurement Postulate and the Second Law
being notable exceptions. Both are poorly understood, and might be linked somehow,
so that, without the first, it is possible the other might also be invalidated in EQM. In
any case, if macrostates refer only to the macroscopic state of the system of interest,
the Second Law would not prevent branches from merging, it would only enact a cost
for this, in terms of an increase in the environmental entropy.
He also appeals [Wal12, p.334] to the Branching-Consistency Theorem. But, as
seen in section 2.3.2, it does not apply to history algebras, so the branching structure
might not be in terms of macrostates, unless these separate history records in the
environment. Anyway, decoherence gives only almost consistency, so the branching
structure would be approximate, with small violations of irreversibility.
If violations are small enough they might not compromise Wallace’s proof, as long
as the State Supervenience axiom remains valid with approximate equalities. But, as
we discuss later, this might not hold.
Reward Availability. Given a set {Mi} of mutually orthogonal macrostates, with
U∨iMi 6= ∅, and for each i a reward subspace ri ∈ R, there is U ∈ U∨iMi such that
OU|Mi ⊂ ri for all i.
Wallace’s justification for the availability of such reward act is that “envelopes of
16
cash can always be given to people” [Wal12, p.167]. But his reward subspaces were
not characterized in terms of prizes, like cash, but in terms of the agent’s preferences.
Unless we are sure to know all an Everettian agent might care about, how can we say
there is always a physically realizable action leading to any such subspace?
For example, as we discuss later, we do not agree with Wallace’s assumption that
the agent is indifferent to branching acts. If he cares about them, they might take him
from one reward subspace into another. A reward act sending him back to the original
reward might require undoing the branching, in a violation of Irreversibility.
Given a partition of H in macrostates {Mi}, and r ∈ R, the axiom would require
an unitary map U : H → H with U(H) ⊂ r, which is impossible if r 6= H. The only
way out is if UH = ∅, but, as discussed in section 3.6, this does not seem to be valid.
Moreover, there seems to be no reason for including the condition U∨iMi 6= ∅ in the
axiom, or for admitting events with no available acts, other than to create a loophole
in an attempt to avoid such contradictions.
Even if E is a proper subspace of H, it may be hard to obtain OU|E ⊂ r. As seen in
section 3.6, as a wavefunction evolves it tends to spread through all space, so most acts
have OU = H. Even if some have OU ⊂ r, arguments of imprecision, as those Wallace
uses for Problem Continuity, imply that in practice we can never be sure to get them.
What seems feasible is to obtain an act producing only very small components outside
r, but until we have the Born rule these can not be neglected. Saying our experience
shows cash can be given without generating extraneous branches would be meaningless,
as our universe might not be governed by EQM. One might also argue that this is just
an idealization, with the agent contemplating such acts in his decision as if they could
be executed with precision. In our discussion of Solution Continuity we explain why
idealizations like this can lead to wrong conclusions. We note that this problem will
also affect Branching Availability and Erasure.
Branching Availability. Let there be given:
• a set {Mi} of mutually orthogonal macrostates, with U∨iMi 6= ∅, and with each
Mi in some ri ∈ R;
• for each i, a nonzero ψi ∈Mi and a set {pij} of positive numbers with
∑
j pij = 1.
Then there is U ∈ U∨iMi such that, for each i,
• OU|Mi ⊂ ri;
• there is a partition OU|Mi = ∨j Nij with Nij ∈M and ‖ΠNijUψi‖
2/‖ψi‖2 = pij.
Such branching act is explained by the possibility of preparing and measuring an
arbitrary quantum state. Again, Wallace does not discuss the hypothesis U∨iMi 6= ∅.
Prizes are not altered in the act, so if reward subspaces were determined by them
this would explain why OU|Mi ⊂ ri. But as R was characterized in terms of the agent’s
preferences, this condition means he can not care about any aspects of the act. This
anticipates the Branching Indifference axiom, and will be discussed with it.
Erasure. Let there be given:
• two countable sets {Mi} and {Ni} of mutually orthogonal macrostates, such that
U∨iMi 6= ∅, U∨iNi 6= ∅ and, for each i, we have Mi, Ni ⊂ ri for some ri ∈ R;
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• for each i, nonzero states ψi ∈Mi and φi ∈ Ni.
Then there are U ∈ U∨iMi and V ∈ U∨iNi such that, for each i, OU|Mi ,OV |Ni ⊂ ri and
Uψi = V φi.
As noted in [Man17a], this axiom has a missing hypothesis, that ‖ψi‖ = ‖φi‖, which
is needed by unitarity, since Wallace does not use normalized states.
To explain such erasures, Wallace says “an agent can just forget any facts about
his situation that don’t concern things he cares about (i.e. by definition: that don’t
concern where in the reward subspace he is)” [Wal12, p.167]. He suggests these acts
take the state of each branch into an erasure subspace, available at any reward, “whose
states correspond to the agent throwing the preparation system away after receiving the
payoff but without recording the actual result of the measurement”. And, as he “lacks
the fine control to know which act he is performing, all erasures should be counted
as available if any are. It follows that, since for any two such agents all erasures are
available, in particular there will be two erasures available satisfying the axiom”.
If ψi and φi are in the same reward ri, they are equivalent in all features relevant
to the agent, and erasures must eliminate the remaining differences. The axiom says
the final states must be identical in all microscopic details, not only macroscopically
similar. So it entails erasing all information about any differences from the environment
and the agent’s memory, which are part of the quantum system. This contradicts ideas
used to justify Irreversibility, which assumed information is preserved in environmental
records. Unless the agent has the unrealistic capability of eliminating all history traces
from the environment, the sets of states to which ψi and φi can be taken, even if by
different acts, should be almost orthogonal, invalidating this axiom.
Even if erasures can be made to work at a pair of branches, the axiom requires them
to be done at many pairs at once. As seen in section 3.6, acts on different branches
are not completely autonomous, but small adjustments might make them compatible.
However, they might perturb the condition Uψi = V φi.
Let us try to detail Wallace’s arguments to see how they fail. He seems to assume
the agent can go from any state of ri into an erasure subspace eri ⊂ ri, and that all
ways to do this (from any given macrostate) are so similar he can not distinguish them
(perhaps Wallace thinks eri is a single macrostate). From this he seems to conclude
the agent can always reach any state of eri , making it easy to obtain Uψi = V φi.
But let M1 and M2 be orthogonal macrostates in the same reward r. By Wallace’s
arguments, an agent at ψ1 ∈ M1 can perform an act U1 such that U1ψ1 ∈ er, while
another version of himself at ψ2 ∈ M2 performs an U2 with U2ψ2 ∈ er, with both
acts being compatible, i.e. restrictions of an U ∈ UM1∨M2 . As Irreversibility gives
OU1 ∧ OU2 = {0}, er has states with enough differences to be in disjoint events. So
there is no reason to expect that all acts leading into er be indistinguishable, even if
they start at the same macrostate.
Still, letM and N be orthogonal macrostates in r, ψ ∈M and φ ∈ N , and suppose
there are erasures U ∈ UM and V ∈ UN such that Uψ = V φ. If acts on distinct
branches can indeed always be made compatible, at a superposition ψ + φ the agent’s
versions could perform U and V at the same time (perhaps with small adjustments),
so they would be restrictions of a W ∈ UM∨N . But then Wψ = Wφ (or at least they
are close states), violating unitarity.
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As before, the condition OU|Mi ,OV |Ni ⊂ ri means the agent can not care about the
processes involved in such acts, and it will be discussed with Branching Indifference.
Problem Continuity. For any E ∈ E with UE 6= ∅, UE is an open subset (in operator
norm topology) of the set of unitary operators from E to H.
This axiom will be discussed with Solution Continuity. We just note here that the
condition UE 6= ∅ is irrelevant, as in topology the empty set is open by definition.
4.2 Preference Axioms
These are conditions the agent’s preference orders≻ψ must satisfy. Wallace labels them
rationality axioms, and calls a decision strategy rational if it satisfies them. This allows
him [Wal12, pp.189–197] to dismiss counterexamples as irrational if they contradict
his axioms (as if such contradictions could not possibly be resolved in detriment of the
axioms). Or to claim ([Wal10, p.237], [Wal12, p.195]) it is possible to decide rationally
in an Everettian universe, since the strategy given by the Born rule satisfies all axioms.
To avoid such mix-up of an arbitrary label with the normal use of “rational” as meaning
reasonable or intelligent, we prefer to call them preference axioms, at least until their
reasonability (or not) can be established.
Equating a set of axioms with rationality is usual in classical decision theory. But
of course this is not arbitrary, there are reasons why the classical axioms are accepted
as mandates of rationality: they may seem intuitively reasonable, or it can be shown
that following them tends to give good results more frequently (e.g. via the law of
large numbers), while violations can lead to bad consequences.
In the Everettian case, can we confirm the rationality of Wallace’s axioms by show-
ing the resulting decision strategy (to follow the Born rule) gives the best possible
results? Hemmo and Pitowsky [HP06] claim the strategy is irrational, as some ver-
sions of the agent get bad results. Wallace [Wal12, p.195] says this problem is not
particular to EQM: in probabilistic settings some people get unlucky. Indeed, bad
branches only invalidate the Born rule if another strategy produces less of them, but
this is meaningless without a way to quantify branches. On the other hand, it also
means we can not say the Born rule maximizes good branches (of course, the measure
given by the rule can not be used to corroborate it). And even if there is a way to
measure branches, other criteria for evaluating results are conceivable in a branching
Universe (e.g. the distributive-justice and variety rules [Wal12, p.192]).
We can not trust intuition either, as an Everettian universe could be quite different
from ours. So any arguments for the rationality of Wallace’s axioms had better be
quite convincing, leaving no room for different possibilities. He has presented many,
and at first sight they may seem reasonable, albeit for wrong reasons: resemblance of
what is rational in our universe, or an implicit expectation that the Born rule be valid.
As we show, there are several reasons to consider them invalid.
Ordering. For each M ∈ M and ψ ∈M , ≻ψ is a total order on UM .
This axiom comes from classical decision theory, and seems reasonable enough.
State Supervenience. Let M,M ′ ∈ M, ψ ∈ M , ψ′ ∈ M ′, U, V ∈ UM and U ′, V ′ ∈
UM ′ . If Uψ = U ′ψ′ and V ψ = V ′ψ′ then U ≻ψ V ⇔ U ′ ≻ψ
′
V ′.
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This means preferences can not depend on the initial states or the betting process,
only on the final states. In classical decision theory, a bet is defined by its payoffs and
their probabilities, with no description of the process or initial state. This simplifica-
tion is usually harmless, as intuition allows us to adjust the model, including in the
description of payoffs factors like time spent or effort. But in the Everettian case it is
not so easy, since we do not know what all relevant factors are.
A possible argument (not presented by Wallace) could be that the final state em-
beds information, in environmental records and the agent’s memories, about the act
and initial state. But this fails with erasures, which are supposed to destroy such infor-
mation, and in Non-Probabilistic Decoherent Histories, where records are unreliable.
In Wallace’s proof, this axiom is used precisely after erasures.
Wallace does not explain why the initial status of the agent (at the moment of
decision) can not have any bearing on his preferences. To explain why all acts con-
necting the same initial and final states are equally preferable, he says [Wal12, p.171]
they differ only on states the agent should not care about, for not being the actual
one. But he notes this could be a limitation of his formalism, which uses single unitary
operators, not detailing the evolution process. The histories formalism would allow
more flexibility, but the agent would have to be indifferent “to the size of the temporal
gaps between history projectors”, and as “we consider sequences of decisions made only
over very short periods of time”, this “entails that acts can be represented by single
unitary transformations”.
This is not convincing. Bets are not so quick that nothing relevant can happen in
the process. In Wallace’s proof they have intermediary steps, with branching acts and
erasures, which might be pertinent, as we discuss later. And lack of a natural temporal
gap does not keep us from placing quantum sample spaces at important steps.
As discussed, for Wallace’s proof to work with small violations of Irreversibility
this axiom would have to be valid even if the final states were only close to each other,
instead of equal. But, as seen in section 2.3.4, even small differences in the states can
represent entirely different worlds, which, despite their tiny Born weights, can not be
neglected and might affect preferences.
For further discussion of this axiom, see [Jan16].
Diachronic Consistency. Let M ∈ M, ψ ∈ M , U ∈ UM and V, V
′ ∈ UOU . Given a
partition OU = ∨iMi with Mi ∈M, let φi = ΠMiUψ. Then:
• if V |Mi<
φi V ′|Mi for all i with Mi not null
9 for ψ and U , then V U <ψ V ′U ;
• if, in addition, V |Mi≻
φi V ′|Mi for at least one such i, then V U ≻
ψ V ′U .
Wallace says this axiom “rules out the possibility of a conflict of interest between an
agent and his future selves” [Wal12, p.168]. But, as shown in [Man17a], such temporal
aspect is only part of the axiom, and it actually follows from State Supervenience. If
φ = Uψ has a single branch, that axiom gives V ≻φ V ′ ⇔ V U ≻ψ V ′U . And it can be
extended to branched states, by defining V ≻φ V ′ to mean all versions of the agent at
φ prefer the restriction of V to their branch over that of V ′.
9M is null for ψ and U iff, whenever acts V1 and V2 are identical on M
⊥, V1U ∼ψ V2U , i.e. the agent
at ψ is indifferent to what happens in M after U . The reason should be that Uψ has no branches in M ,
but there are problems with this concept [Man17a].
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The really new idea introduced by this axiom is Branch Independence [Man17a]:
preference between acts, at a branched state, is independent of branches in which their
restrictions are equivalent for the agent, being determined only by those where he has
a strict preference. Wallace does not discuss this idea, which is an Everettian version
of the classically controversial Independence or Sure-Thing Principle [PI09]. To see the
problem with it, consider the following bets:
A: an electron spin, with equal Born weights for up and down, is measured, with the
agent receiving $1,000 in up branches, and paying $100 in down ones.
B: an electron spin, prepared in a state like the one above, is measured, with the
agent receiving $1,000 in up branches, and nothing in down ones.
C: bet B is performed, and in the down branches it is followed by A.
In A the agent has more to gain than to lose (assuming he can afford to pay $100),
so we can assume he might prefer it over doing nothing, i.e. A ≻ 1. Note that we do
not need the Born rule to justify this, we can simply use the symmetry of the state.
Diachronic Consistency then implies C ≻ B.
But C gives a set of branches where he gets $1,000 and one where he pays $100,
while B produces a set where he receives $1,000 and another where he loses nothing.
To prefer C over B he must think the $1,000 set is in some sense larger or more relevant
in C than in B, to compensate for the branches in which he has a loss. So we need
him to believe there is a physically meaningful measure, even if unknown, which is
increased by the new $1,000 branches resulting from A. But there seems to be no
reason for such belief to be mandatory in EQM, if branch counting is impossible and
we can not assume he knows or accepts the Born rule.
Another way to look at this is that Branch Independence forbids decisions in one
branch from taking into consideration knowledge of the existence of others. If the agent
would normally consider A ≻ 1, his opinion can not be changed by knowledge that
he is in a down branch of B and there is already a set of $1,000 branches. So he can
not think that if he plays A the new $1,000 branches will simply blend into the set of
preexisting ones, without increasing its size or relevance (which may be ill defined) to
make up for the branches where he will pay $100. But, again, without branch counting
or the Born rule, nothing in EQM seems to imply that this would be an unreasonable
line of thought.
Branching Indifference. Let r ∈ R, M ∈ M with M ⊂ r, ψ ∈ M , and U ∈ UM . If
Uψ ∈ r then U ∼ψ 1M .
This means the agent is indifferent to acts keeping him in the same reward subspace,
reflecting the characterization of these as being determined by his preferences. Despite
its name, the axiom does not assume U is a branching act, and in Wallace’s proof it is
also used with erasures. Formally, such use relies on conditions of the form OU|Mi ⊂ ri
included in Branching Availability and Erasure. But, as previously noted, to justify
these conditions one must explain why the agent should not care about the actual
processes involved in branching acts and erasures.
For erasures, Wallace says the agent is indifferent by construction [Wal12, p.167].
Perhaps he means that only details the agent does not care about need to be erased, as
states in the same reward are already equivalent in whatever matters to him. But this
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does not mean he must be indifferent to the erasure procedure in itself, as it may take
a lot of work and time to erase all records from the environment (if it is even possible),
and even his memories of the bet need to be wiped somehow.
For branching acts, he says “an agent doesn’t care about branching per se: if a
certain operation leaves his future selves in N different macrostates but doesn’t change
any of their rewards, he is indifferent as to whether or not the operation is performed”
[Wal12, p.170]. His use of the term reward here is ambiguous:
• if it refers to a prize, like cash, the quantum measurement performed in a branch-
ing act does not change it. But this does not mean the agent remains in the same
reward subspace, which is characterized in terms of preferences and not prizes;
• if it refers to reward subspaces, the argument is circular: the agent’s indifference
is justified by claiming the branching act does not change the reward subspaces,
but an act only keeps him in the same reward if he is indifferent to it.
Wallace also says that “a preference order which is not indifferent to branching per
se would in practice be impossible to act on: branching is uncontrollable and ever-
present in an Everettian universe” [Wal12, p.170]. This seems at odds with his view
that coarse graining keeps such wild proliferation of branches under control. Anyway,
can we be sure an Everettian universe would be sufficiently well behaved to allow
agents (if they can even exist) to make reasonable decisions and act accordingly10? As
discussed, Wallace’s argument that rationality is possible because there is a strategy
satisfying his axioms is not valid, until we conclude the axioms are reasonable.
But why would the agent care about branchings? Maybe he thinks they alter the
ratio of branches with each payoff. Wallace dismisses this since there is no well defined
number of branches, as seen in section 2.2. But failure of a crude idea of branch
counting does not exhaust all possibilities. There might be more sophisticated ways
to compare the size or relevance of sets of branches (there is the Born rule, but we
can not assume it is physically meaningful in an Everettian universe). In fact, as seen,
Diachronic Consistency implicitly assumes the agent believes a measure of relevance
exists, even if he does not know which (again, to avoid circularity, we can not presume
he believes in the Born rule). So the question is whether he has a reason to think such
unkown measure is preserved by branchings. We throw a few ideas, just to show he
might actually think otherwise:
• there might be an optimal interval of coarse graining, fine enough not to mix
macroscopically distinct states, yet coarse enough to reduce interference and keep
the number of branches reasonably stable. The average branch number in this
interval (perhaps giving smaller weights to the less stable numbers obtained with
finer grainings) might be a good measure, not preserved by branchings;
• branches with tiny Born weights can suffer much interference, so one might count
only the more stable causal histories [Man17b];
• even if one can not attribute a precise number to sets of branches, obtaining a
reasonably stable ratio between them is enough to estimate relative relevance;
10Of course, this brings the whole decision theoretic approach into question.
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• there may be a qualitative way to compare the complexity of branching structures,
showing that quantum measurements make them more ramified.
Even if these ideas fail, the point is we can not say a branching sensitive measure is
impossible just because we do not know any. Not proving the relevance of branchings
is not the same as proving their irrelevance. So it would be unreasonable for the agent
to dismiss beforehand the possibility of such a measure, and decide as if he knew
branchings could be ignored.
This axiom has been criticized by other authors [DB13a, DB13b, Lew16, Mal08].
Wilson [Wil13] criticizes Wallace’s arguments, but defends the axiom on the basis of
indexicalism.
Solution Continuity. Let M ∈ M, ψ ∈ M and U, V ∈ UM . If U ≻ψ V then
U ′ ≻ψ V ′ for any U ′, V ′ ∈ UM sufficiently close (in the operator norm) to U and V .
Wallace justifies this, and Problem Continuity, “in terms of the limitations of any
physically realisable agent. Any discontinuous preference order would require an agent
to make arbitrarily precise distinctions between different acts, something which is not
physically possible. Any preference order which could not be extended to allow for
arbitrarily small changes in the acts considered would have the same requirement”
[Wal12, p.170].
These arguments seem to rely on the notion, from our physical experience, that
very close acts differ only on unnoticeable, hence irrelevant, details (e.g. the value of
a quantity being slightly off). But in an Everettian universe, with branches defined
via Non-Probabilistic Decoherent Histories, small perturbations can create completely
different new worlds. Without a Born rule, these can not be considered any less
relevant, despite their small Born weights.
But let us assume the agent is really unable to distinguish close acts, so that, as
Wallace argues, he can not have a discontinuous preference. This does not imply he
has a (non-trivial) continuous preference. As we will argue, it might actually lead to a
breakdown in his decision-making capability (in which case we must even question the
possibility of intelligent life under Everettian conditions).
First let us examine how physical imprecision affects Wallace’s formalism of acts. If
an act U , used to represent a bet, can never be executed with absolute precision, and
can not be perfectly distinguished from other acts in a small neighborhood NU , then
the bet should actually be represented byNU . To decide the agent should compare such
neighborhoods, not individual acts in them. Of course, if preferences are continuous
then it is valid to take U as a representative of NU . Hence, in adopting a formalism of
individual acts, Wallace is already assuming Solution Continuity. So let us take a step
back and consider preferences between neighborhoods.
Let U be an act in which an electron is prepared in a state of spin up and measured,
with the agent receiving $1,000 if the result is up, and paying $1,000,000 if it is down.
In Wallace’s idealization of individual acts, we should have U ≻ 1. But in reality,
when offered such bet, the agent ought to compare small neighborhoods NU and N1.
Let Uǫ ∈ NU be an act similar to U , but in which the preparation or measurement
were slightly imprecise, generating branches, of total Born weight ǫ, with result down.
With the Born rule we could still say Uǫ ≻ 1, as for ǫ small enough such branches are
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negligible, and generalize the argument to conclude that NU ≻ N1, in agreement with
the preference obtained through the idealization.
But until we have such rule we can not equate tiny Born weights with irrelevance.
So the agent might consider that any Uǫ, with ǫ > 0, results in a set of branches where
he gets $1,000 and another where he pays $1,000,000, with no meaningful way to say
one is larger or more relevant than the other. And he might conclude he has too much
to lose if the act executed turns out to be Uǫ instead of U . As in NU there are infinitely
many acts like Uǫ and only one U , he might decide that NU ≺ N1. Hence comparison
of individual acts might not be a harmless idealization, leading to wrong results.
Problem Continuity makes this even worse. Small perturbations of any act can
introduce all sorts of branches in the final state. When offered U , the agent would
have to consider not only perturbations creating branches where he loses $1,000,000,
but also branches where he dies, becomes a king, gets an unicorn11, or anything he can
imagine. Such states do exist somewhere in the Hilbert space, and Problem Continuity
provides acts creating tiny components in them (even if, by the Born rule, such branches
would be nearly impossible in our universe). As both NU and N1 have acts creating
all possible branches, comparing them becomes an impossibly complex task, and the
agent might just give up deciding anything. Or decide all options are always equally
preferable, since all acts, when perturbed, can lead to the same results (all possible
ones), and (unless the Born rule can still be proven) he has no reason to believe some
are less relevant than others.
Act Nondegeneracy. There are M ∈M, ψ ∈M and U, V ∈ UM such that U ≻ψ V .
This is not one of Wallace’s axioms, but, as shown in [Man17a], it must be included
to ensure Born weights really play a role in his result. If the agent is always indifferent
to all acts, the result is obtained trivially by setting equal utilities for all rewards. But
then it would be valid even if the expected utilities had been defined with any other
weights instead of the Born ones. So in this case Wallace’s result would not confer the
Born weights any special significance.
A justification for this axiom might be that, in real life, decisions are seldom trivial,
and strict preferences are usually present. But this is based on experience in our
universe. As discussed above, it is conceivable that, under Everettian conditions, the
only reasonable attitude might be indifference to all acts, in all situations.
Macrostate Indifference. Let M,M ′,M1,M2 ∈ M, ψ ∈ M , ψ′ ∈ M ′, U, V ∈ UM ,
U ′, V ′ ∈ UM ′ , and r1, r2 ∈ R. If OU ,OU ′ ⊂ M1 ∧ r1 and OV ,OV ′ ⊂ M2 ∧ r2, then
U <ψ V ⇔ U ′ <ψ
′
V ′.
In [Man17a], this axiom has been shown to have many problems, which point to
ambiguities in the concepts of macrostate and reward. But it has also been shown to
be unnecessary for the proof, so we will not discuss it any longer.
11There is nothing unphysical in a horned horse, even if in our world no such species has evolved.
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5 Conclusion
In [Man17a], Wallace’s formal proof was found to be, for the most part, correct, even
if some details needed fixing. But the interpretation of his result, as meaning that
rational Everettian agents decide as if the Born rule were valid, is not immediate. It
demands, in particular, that his axioms can really be seen as mandates of rationality
under Everettian conditions.
Unfortunately, we have found most axioms to be far from reasonable. Moreover,
some concepts he uses present ambiguities and contradictions which seem hard to
resolve. The main problems identified are:
1. Without the Born rule, Wallace’s solution of the preferred basis problem does not
work as expected. Branches might be nothing like our world, lacking complex
structures or behaving erratically. This compromises the whole decision theoretic
approach, which depends on narratives where agents exist, their actions have the
expected consequences, and rationality is possible.
2. Macrostates are expected to emerge from that solution, but Wallace does not
detail how they are defined or what properties they are supposed to have. He
gives vague ideas, which seem contradicted by some of his examples and the
formalization of some axioms.
3. It is not even clear whether macrostates describe the macroscopic state of just
the system of interest, or also its environment. To justify Irreversibility, history
records in the environment must be separated in distinct macrostates, as the
Branching-Consistency Theorem does not extend to history algebras.
4. The Boolean condition on events requires that branches be mutually orthogonal.
This is a harmless idealization in the usual decoherent histories formalism, but in
its non-probabilistic version such branches become erratic. More realistic branch
decompositions are almost orthogonal, but even tiny deviations from orthogo-
nality can have important consequences, such as branch decompositions being
non-unique, and not even similar.
5. The concept of reward subspaces is ambiguous. Wallace characterizes them in
terms of anything that might affect the agent’s preferences. But in his justification
of Reward Availability, and when he states that branching acts and erasures do
not change rewards, he seems to rely implicitly on a more concrete idea of rewards,
as representing tangible prizes like cash.
6. The definition of rewards as subspaces embeds an unjustified assumption about
the agent’s preferences: that if he is indifferent between two states in a reward,
he must also be indifferent between any of them and a superposition of both.
7. Reward Availability leads to a contradiction when applied in a typical state (with
components in all macrostates), unless UH = ∅, which does not seem to be the
case (even if it was, this seems more like a loophole than a valid condition).
8. Reward Availability, Branching Availability and Erasure require acts with images
confined to reward subspaces. Due to physical imprecision these can hardly be
obtained in practice, and as idealizations can lead to wrong results.
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9. Irreversibility and Erasure rely on conflicting claims about the preservation or
elimination of history records.
10. Use of Erasure at several pairs of branches may require adjustments to make the
acts compatible, perturbing the equality of final states. On the other hand, the
idea that acts on different branches can always be made compatible leads to a
contradiction when applied to a pair of erasures.
11. For State Supervenience, Wallace does not explain the irrelevance of initial states,
and for the acts his arguments are unconvincing. Claiming the final state embeds
information about the whole process is not valid with erasures (which is how the
axiom is used in the proof) or with Non-Probabilistic Decoherent Histories.
12. Wallace justifies the temporal aspect of Diachronic Consistency (which is, any-
how, implied by State Supervenience), but not why preferences in one branch can
not take into account knowledge of others. This requires the agent to believe in a
(possibly unknown) way to measure or compare the relevance of sets of branches,
but there is no reason why such belief should be mandated by EQM.
13. Despite its name, or Wallace’s informal description and justification for it, the
formal statement of Branching Indifference makes no reference to branching acts,
and in the proof it is also used with erasures.
14. The reason for indifference to erasures is unclear. Even if the agent does not care
about what is erased, it does not mean he is indifferent to the erasure process.
15. Wallace’s arguments for indifference to branchings rely on the ambiguity of the
term reward, and on assumptions we can not be sure to be valid in an Everettian
universe: the possibility of acting rationally, and the impossibility of alternatives
to branch counting besides the Born rule.
16. With Non-Probabilistic Decoherent Histories, branch discontinuities compromise
Solution Continuity, Problem Continuity, and a new axiom of Act Nondegeneracy
(needed to ensure Born weights play a role in Wallace’s result).
17. Macrostate Indifference, as shown in [Man17a], has many problems, but is un-
necessary.
As can be seen, Wallace’s formalization of Deutsch’s ideas, instead of confirming
them, actually exposes many unforeseen difficulties. Solving all of them, even if one
believes it to be feasible (we do not), does not seem like an easy task. So one musk
ask whether Wallace’s result is worth the trouble. Assuming it can still be obtained
from a better set of axioms, in a following article we discuss whether it can really be
interpreted as showing the Born rule has a real significance in Everettian Quantum
Mechanics.
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